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TAXATION OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS AFTER
1976: A WHOLE NEW BALLGAME
HOWARD ZARITSKY*
1976 marked a dramatic alteration in the taxation of professional
sports teams. Owners of professional teams now find themselves
forced from a state of grace within the tax laws' that had helped
promote the incredibly rapid growth of the sports industry.' Owners
now must learn to cope with seemingly oppressive limits on their tax
advantages if they are to survive. This Article provides guidance in
facilitating adjustment to the new laws and looks into the altered
* A.B., Emory University; J.D., John Stetson University College of Law; LL.M., George-
town University Law Center. Private practice, Arlington, Virginia. Consulting Tax Attorney
to the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Professional Sports. The
opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the House Select Committee on Profes-
sional Sports but are solely those of the author.
1. The aura that protected professional sports from more severe taxation is manifested in
the exemption of sports from the normal rules governing the taxation of the sale or exchange
of franchises. Like other capital assets, the gain from the sale or exchange of a franchise was
held to constitute long term capital gains if the franchise was held at least six months. I.R.C.
§ 1221. See also Dairy Queen of Okla., Inc. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1957).
Thereafter, Congress enacted a new rule which provided that if a franchisee retained signifi-
cant powers, rights, or continuing interests in the transferred franchise, the gain from the sale
or exchange would be ordinary income. I.R.C. § 1253(a). However, a special exemption was
provided for franchises to engage in "professional football, basketball, baseball, or other
p rofessional sport." I.R.C. § 1253(e). When Dr. Lawrence Woodworth, then Chief of Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, was asked why sports franchises were given the special
treatment, he responded:
I think that when this treatment was provided in 1969, the exception was made
for sports enterprises, primarily because of uncertainty as to what its effect
would be on the sports industry. If I recall correctly, it was the desire or feeling
which I think was generally prevalent then in the Congress, that the sports
industry should probably get a little special treatment relative to other indus-
tries, in part because it was thought of as not so much a business but a sport.
Whether that treatment should be continued or not is a question.
Inquiry Into Professional Sports: Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Professional
Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 341-42 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee
Hearing]. The posture of the tax laws that sports are not a business terminated with the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.
2. The rapid growth of professional sports may be seen in statistics from the four major
sports: hockey, baseball, basketball, and football. Between 1959 and 1974, these sports ex-
panded from five leagues and 42 teams to eight leagues and 114 teams. Note, The Professional
Sports Team as a Tax Shelter-A Case Study: The Utah Stars, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 556, 557
[hereinafter cited as Utah Stars], citing Libby, A Look at Professional Sports, Salt Lake
Tribune, Sept. 1, 1974, at D-3, Col.6. Although the American Basketball Association has
merged into the National Basketball Association and the World Football League has ceased
operations, the growth of professional sports has been dramatic.
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future of professional sports taxation.3
The dramatic change in the tax posture of professional sports
teams was precipitated by significant changes in the restrictions on
player mobility imposed by sports leagues and the enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.1 These changes interplay with both the
structure of the professional sports team and those features of the
tax law that traditionally governed the industry's financial status.
Consequently, the structure of the industry and its basic tax treat-
ment are an essential framework upon which the future of sports
taxation will be built.
THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAM
Any professional team sport operates within the structure of a
league and its authorized franchises. The league is the'governing
organization; the franchises are the governed entities. The athletes
are merely employees of the governed franchises. The professional
sports league is a tax-exempt organization5 normally established as
a corporation or association. It is governed by a constitution, by-
laws, and rules which detail league functions of any magnitude.'
3. This Article addresses only the developments in the taxation of professional sports
teams. The changes that affect the taxation of professional athletes themselves, though
interesting and important, are beyond the scope of this Article and deserve their own treat-
ment. Briefly, however, the nature of the athlete's short career and relatively high salary
makes it important to consider such recently altered problems as the maximum tax on
personal service income and its application to deferred compensation, the minimum tax on
tax preferences, the new rules on estate planning, and the new limitations on tax-sheltered
investments.
4. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 212, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
5. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
(c) List of exempt organizations-
(6) Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of
trade, or professonal football leagues (whether or not administering a pension
fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Id. Although the language of § 501(c)(6) specifically mentions football leagues as tax exempt
entities, other professional sports leagues apparently receive tax exempt status because they
are "business leagues." See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960). There are no cases
on record in which the Internal Revenue Service has challenged the tax exempt status of
professional sports leagues.
6. The location of all major decison-making authority in the league, rather than in the
teams, has been attributed to the "unique economics of professional sports." STAFF OF THE
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
AND THE LAW 8 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMMITTEE STUDY]. Among
the factors determined at the league level are geographic division of the market area, rules of
practice limiting competition and the selling of the industry, and distribution of admissions
revenues, broadcasting revenues, and franchise rights. Id. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
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The league normally is headed by a commissioner who exercises the
powers granted him under the aforementioned instruments.
Although the professional sports team operates within the struc-
ture of league rules and decisions, the team is the unit with which
the public most readily can associate.' The team is actually a fran-
chise right by which the owners or franchisees are granted exclusive
authority to present sporting events in a given geographical area.8
The franchise is acquired either from the league or from other fran-
chisees and may be organized in any of the typical forms of business
enterprise including proprietorship, general or limited partnership,
and ordinary or Subchapter S corporation. 0 The franchisees may
ON INT. REV. TAXATION, for the COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG. 2D SEss., TAX SHEL-
TERS: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISES 1 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as JOINT
COMMITTEE PRINT]; Horvitz & Hoffman, New Tax Developments in the Syndication of Sports
Franchises, 54 TAXES 175, 176 (1976).
7. JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 1; Horvitz & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 176.
8. The league not only controls the daily operations of the franchises but also distributes
franchise rights and regulates admission and expulsion from the league. SELECT COMMITTEE
STUDY, supra note 6, at 8-9.
9. The franchise right's monopoly on sporting events in a designated area makes it a
valuable commodity. The relative value of the monopoly right, however, differs among teams
in the league:
In most areas the monopoly means very little; it has little tangible value particu-
larly in areas that are small. The monopoly value of being able to provide the
only baseball game in Oakland is minuscule in comparison to being able to
provide the only game in New York City. New York City is a very large city that
creates monopoly revenues because of that territorial restriction.
In the absence of that territorial restriction there might be something on the
order of five or eight teams that could viably survive. So the territorial restric-
tion that is enforced by the antitrust immunity creates an uneven monopoly
profit depending upon the size of the city.
SELECT COMMITTEE HEARING, supra note 1, pt.2, at 118. See also JOINT COMMITEE PRINT, supra
note 6, at 1; Okner, Taxation and Sports Enterprises, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS
BUSINESS 159, 162 (R. Noll ed. 1974); Weill, Depreciation of Players Contracts-The Govern-
ment is Ahead at the Half, 53 TAXES 581, 586-90 (1975); Note, Professional Sports Franchising
and the IRS, 14 WASHBURN L. REv. 321, 322 (1975).
10. In 1976, for example, the National Baseball League's dozen teams were organized as
two Subchapter S corporations, a Canadian partnership, three ordinary corporations, and six
"d.o." (dual ownership) corporations. The American Baseball League's dozen teams were
organized as a sole proprietorship, two Subchapter S corporations, a limited partnership,
three ordinary corporations, and five "d.o." corporations. Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings
on H.R. 10612 Before the Comm. on Finance of the Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at
642 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Hearings]. In 1971, professional basketball
reflected a similar diversity; the two leagues were composed of four partnerships, ten Sub-
chapter S corporations, four publicly held corporations, four subsidiary corporations, five
corporations of unspecified characteristics, and one business trust. Professional Basketball:
Hearings on S. 2373 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 995 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Basketball Hearings].
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use any financial structure that meets their needs, including varying
debt-equity ratios, subject only to league rules." Additionally, the
franchise may possess a large number of assets of varying character-
istics and importance. These assets may have been the greatest
contributor to the Congressional sentiment that professional sports
franchises were tax-sheltered investments 2 and may have led to the
sports team restrictions contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The franchise right is the most basic and essential asset of the
professional sports team. It is a contract with the league guarantee-
ing not only the exclusive right to produce a certain type of sporting
event in a particular locale but also the right to participate in player
drafts and other player acquisitions, to share in the proceeds of
league contracts with television networks, to have the benefit of
league settlement of both interteam and team-player disputes, to
have the services of league officials, and to be governed by the
league constitution, by-laws, and rules.' 3 The most important fea-
11. In professional baseball, for example,. little debt is used to finance the acquisition of
franchises. In the last six years, only seven baseball franchises were sold and the average
purchase price of $10 million was composed of an average $7 million in equity and $3 million
in debt. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 10, at 636. In the American Basketball Associa-
tion, however, there were some acquisitions by debt financing, notably the Utah Stars fran-
chise which was acquired for $175,000 basis stock and $240,000 in debt. Utah Stars, supra
note 2, at 564. The debt/equity ratio and the use of nonrecourse debt financing is important
because, by leveraging the investment with large amounts of nonrecourse debt, the investor
can generate tax deductions in excess of cash expenditures. See Select Committee Hearings,
supra note 1, pt. 2, at 323; JOINT COMMrrTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 1.
12. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 419-20 (1976); S. REP. No. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 86-91 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-85 (1975); JOINT
COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 6; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXA-
TION FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW OF
TAX SHELTERS 1, 8-9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OVERVIEW oF TAX SHELTERS]. "Tax Shelter"
usually implies an investment tailored to allow taxpayers to offset certain artificial losses
(that is, noneconomic losses but losses which are available as deductions under the present
tax laws) not only against the income from those investments but also against the taxpayer's
other income, usually from his regular business or professional activity. A major purpose of
these investments for most taxpayers is to reduce the tax liability on their regular income.
OVERVIEW OF TAX SHELTERS at 1. Tax-sheltered investments accomplish this objective through
three major devices: "deferral" of taxes by accelerating deductions, increasing them in early
years of the venture with the concomitant reduction in later years; "leverage" of the acquisi-
tion with large amounts of nonrecourse debt financing; and "conversion" of ordinary income
into capital gains through taking deductions against ordinary current income but realizing
capital gains at disposition. See id. at 1-5.
13. JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee Report]; Okner, supra note 9, at 162; Jones,
Amortization and Nonamortization of Intangibles in the Sports World, 53 TAXES 777, 784
(1975).
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ture of the franchise right, however, is the monopoly factor. 4
Each franchise is guaranteed a secure monopoly for its services in
a distinct area by league rules which normally require consent of all
or most of the present franchise owners prior to admission of a new
franchise or movement of an existing franchise. 5 The operative
value of this protected monopoly right may be seen in both current
income production and in special payments. The current income is
derived from advertising revenues, gate receipts," radio and local
television contracts, concessions, parking, and films of sporting
events.'7 Occasionally, a special payment will be made to a team for
lost exclusivity when another team is added to the league by merger
or expansion. s
Broadcasting rights, a facet of the team's franchise rights, play a
prominent role in the finances of sports teams." The value of the
television rights is enhanced by league regulation and control over
14. Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 111, 118-20, 164-66; Weill, supra
note 9, at 584-88..
15. These guarantees of a secure monopoly usually are contained in the league constitution
and are one of the owners' most vital rights. See Select Committee Report, supra note 13, at
45; SELECT COMMITrEE STUDY, supra note 6, at 45.
16. Gate receipts constitute one of the major sources of any team's revenues, and atten-
dance differences have been considered a major reason for one team's success and another
team's failure. SELECT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 6, at 9; Noll, The U.S. Team Sports
Industry: An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESs 1, 15-16 (R. Noll ed.
1974).
17. See JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 1; Select Committee Report, supra note
13, at 93; Jones, supra note 13, at 784; Weill, supra note 9, at 584-88. See also Laird v. United
States, 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2113 (5th Cir. Apr. 17,
1975), cross appeal docketed, (5th Cir. May 28, 1975); Internal Revenue Service Manual,
Audit Coordination Digest No. 65 (January 2, 1973), suspended by Manual Supplement No.
45G-213 (September 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as IRS Manual].
18. When the American Football League merged into the National Football League, two
NFL teams received special indemnity payments in addition to their share of the ordinary
entrance fees paid by AFL teams. The New York Giants received $10 million for the introduc-
tion of the New York Jets into their area, and the San Francisco 49ers received an addi-
tional $8 million for the introduction of the Oakland Raiders. Weill, supra note 9, at 584-85.
When the American Basketball Association was merged into the National Basketball Asso-
ciation, the New York Nets had to pay the New York Knicks an additional $4 million for
their "infringement." Select Committee Report, supra note 13, at 34. The Internal Revenue
Service treats this compensation for infringement of territorial rights as a capital gain. See
Rev. Rul. 71-583, 1971-2 C.B. 112.
19. In 1975, for example, the national television contracts between the networks and profes-
sional baseball produced $9.6 million in revenues, and local contracts with baseball produced
$26,495 million. This averaged to $1.504 million per team, In that same year, professional
football received $50.1 million from its national contract and $2.948 million from its local
contracts, averaging out at $2.04 million per club. Select Committee Report, supra note 13,
at 688.
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national broadcasting, which is permitted by federal legislation. 0
The revenues from these league contracts with television networks
are shared by all teams equally, regardless of relative success in
athletics during any season."' Local television and radio broadcast-
ing, however, are controlled by the team, and league rules reinforce
the exclusive rights of a team to negotiate local contracts for any
sporting event not included in the national contract.2
Most of the acquisition capital of a team is allocated to the player
service contracts rather than to the franchise right, making these
contracts one of the team's most significant assets. 3 The contracts
bind a player or coach24 to perform services for the team for a single
year, a term of years, or even for an indefinite or perpetual period. 25
The current trend in many sports, however, is toward multi-year
contracts.26 These contracts actually are one-year contracts bound
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1974). The 1961 law expressly exempts from federal antitrust laws
the television pooling agreements in football, baseball, basketball, and hockey, but other
sports are not mentioned.
21. SELECT COMMITrEE STUDY, supra note 6, at 9. In certain cases, however, a new team or
group of new teams will be excluded from standing national contracts with television net-
works. This occurred in 1968 when the American Baseball League expanded to admit teams
in Seattle and Kansas City. See Papers filed in Kaufman v. United States, No. 289-76, (Ct.
Cl., filed July 16, 1976). In 1976, when the American Basketball Association was merged into
the National Basketball Associaton, the four ABA teams taken into the NBA were forbidden
to participate in the national television contract pool for five years. Select Committee Report,
supra note 13, at 34.
22. SELECT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
23. A 1971 study of basketball revealed that 69.4% of the acquisition cost of a franchise in
the American Basketball Association was allocated to player contracts and 85.4% of the cost
of a National Basketball Association team was allocated to these contracts. Basketball Hear-
ings, supra note 10, pt. 2, at 615. The average allocation was between 70% and 75%, with one
franchise allocating 98.4% of the acquisition cost to player contracts. Okner, supra note 9, at
162-63. In a number of cases awaiting litigation at this time, the percentages of consideration
allocated to these contracts have also been quite high. See Kaufman v. United States, No.
289-76 (Ct. Cl., filed July 16, 1976) (98% allocation); Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., No.
7486-74 (T.C., filed Sept. 9, 1974) (97%); Charles 0. Finley & Co., No. 8342-71 (TC., filed
Dec. 16, 1971) (83%); id., Nos. 7219-73, 7220-73 (T.C., filed Sept. 27, 1973) (83%); Charles
0. & Shirley Finley, No. 8343-71 (T.C., filed Dec. 16, 1971) (83%). In the only reported
decision on point, the allocation sought by the owners was approximately 84%. Laird v.
United States, 391 F. Supp. 656, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
24. Although player service contracts may be used to secure the services of either a player
or coach, most are used for players. All references herein are to contracts for the services of
players.
25. These contracts may take different forms depending upon the sport and the status of
the player. Rookies and veterans do not necessarily desire or receive the same standard
contracts, and the terms of the contract with respect to duration may depend upon the
relative playing ability of the athlete. The different contracts normally used are discussed
elsewhere in this Article.
26. Select Committee Report, supra note 13, at 32. This trend is particularly visible in
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together by a common set of conditions. If the athlete is injured in
the third year of a so-called five-year contract, he may be paid for
the services rendered during the remainder of the third year. How-
ever, no payments will be made in the fourth or fifth year unless the
player can again meet the health and medical requirements of the
contract. 7
The assets of the team are used to produce current operating
revenues and long term disposition revenues for the franchise own-
ers. Current profits are derived from the rendition of services
through a joint venture with other teams to produce an exclusive
sporting event which is marketed to the public. The gate receipts
are divided between the home team and challenger according to
league rules, which may vary widely from sport to sport. 8 In addi-
tion, the teams derive current revenue from national and local
broadcasting rights, concessions, parking, and advertising. Indirect
benefits also can accrue to the franchise owner from publicity given
to his other business interests."
The franchise also generates revenue when it is sold or exchanged.
This gain is measured by the difference between the acquisition
baseball because of changes in the reserve clause and league rules permitting increased
mobility.
27. Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 304-05. Martin Blackman, a noted
player representative, explained:
When you hear that someone signed a 3- or 4- year contract, these are actually
a series of 1- year agreements. The signing of a 5-year contract does not really
bind the obligations for 5 years. It is a year-to-year contract. It is five single
contracts . . . so that in the first year of a contract, let's assume on the first
day of that football exhibition season a player is injured and he has signed a 5-
year contract. He will get compensated that first year and his medical bills will
be paid that first year. But if he is unable to make the club the second year,
the contract stops.
Id.
28. In baseball, the split is 85/15 in favor of the home team in each game. In football, the
split is 60/40 in favor of the home team. In basketball and hockey, the home team receives
all of the gate receipts. Select Committee Report, supra note 13, at 45.
29. One commentator noted:
Who is to distinguish between profits of Auggie Busch's brewery and the St.
Louis Cardinals? One has to treat them as a kind of joint enterprise. The finan-
cial position of the St. Louis Cardinals cannot be viewed independently to what
is happening to the brewery since it can be shown that . . . the position of St.
Louis and its relative league standing affects the amount of beer that is sold in
the greater St. Louis area.
Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 121. Charles 0. Finley stated that one of
the reasons he acquired the Kansas City Athletics and moved them to Oakland, California,
was to obtain the indirect advertising and public relations benefits for his insurance company.
Brief for Appellant, Charles 0. Finley & Co., No. 8342-71 (T.C., filed Dec. 16, 1971).
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cost, adjusted for capital additions or asset depreciation, and the
sales price received by the owner.3" The acquisition cost would be
either the amount paid another owner for the team or, if the team
is acquired in league expansion, the amount paid the league and
thereafter distributed among the existing teams. The income tax
problems of the team owner stem from structuring the acquisition
or disposition of the franchise in a manner primarily designed to
lighten the tax burden. The owner's ability to do this has been
altered significantly by the events of 1976. To understand these
changes, it is necessary to examine the general tax treatment of a
professional sports team.
GENERAL TAX TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
The taxation of the professional sports team as an entity is largely
an incident of the tax treatment accorded individual franchise as-
sets, particularly the player contracts and franchise right. Other
assets, notably the television rights and stadium lease, contribute
toward the financial operations of the franchise, but the essence of
a franchise's tax planning must center on the franchise and con-
tracts. The franchise right historically has been treated as a capital
asset 31 that is nonamortizable because its useful life is incapable of
reasonable ascertainment.2 If the franchise had been held at least
six months before disposition, the gain or loss from its sale or ex-
change was treated as a long term capital gain or loss. 33 The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 extended the holding period to nine months for
1977,'3 but any gain or loss realized will continue to be treated as a
long term capital gain or loss.
For the last ten years, player contracts have been treated as amor-
tizable business property under section 1231.11 Early judicial deci-
30. Okner, supra note 9, at 173.
31. Rev. Rul. 123, 1971-1 C.B. 227.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 states: "If an intangible asset is known from experience or
other factors to be of use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited
period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible
asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance." However, if there is no limited useful
life or the useful life of the asset is not capable of reasonable estimation, it may not be
amortized.
33. I.R.C. § 1231.
34. After 1977, the holding period will be one year. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 1402(a), 90 Stat. 1731 (amending I.R.C. § 1222).,
35. Rev. Rul. 379, 1967-2 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 123, 1971-1
C.B. 227; Rev. Rul. 137, 1971-1 C.B. 104. These rulings apply to major league player contracts
specifically. Because minor league teams hold their players for sale to the major leagues in
[Vol. 18:679
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sions" and rulings of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)37 held that
the contracts had a maximum useful life of one year; thus, they
could be expensed rather than capitalized. 8 In 1967, the IRS ruled
that because the league rules and the reserve clause in the standard
form baseball contract had the effect of binding a player to one team
for his entire career, the contract had a useful life beyond one year
and would have to be capitalized and amortized. 9 In 1971, a similar
ruling stated that because football players tended to remain with
one team for their entire careers, the standard football contract
would have to be capitalized and amortized as well.40 These rulings
were viewed generally as extending to other sports as well, and all
player contracts were considered amortizable section 1231 assets.
The basis a team was required to take in its player contracts was
the total of any payments made to acquire the contract, including
both indemnity paid to another team as compensation for loss of the
athlete and bonuses paid to the athlete for signing the contract." A
bonus not paid in the year of acquisition, however, could be treated
the ordinary course of their business, these contracts constitute neither "section 1231 assets"
nor capital assets. Gain from the sale or exchange of a player contract by a minor league
normally would constitute ordinary income. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423
F.2d 494, 503 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Klinger, Professional Sports Teams: Tax Factors in
Buying, Owning and Selling Them, 39 J. TAx. 276, 277 n.2 (1973).
36. Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 72 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1934), aff'g 27 B.T.A.
1074 (1933), acq. in CH XIV-2, 17 (1935); Commissioner v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club,
74 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1935); Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600
(8th Cir. 1935). But see Dallas Athletic Ass'n, 8 B.T.A. 1036 (1927); Houston Baseball Ass'n,
24 B.T.A. 69 (1935).
37. C.B. X1-2, 17 (1935); Rev. Rul. 441, 1954-2 C.B. 101. Although the 1954 ruling held
that individually purchased or acquired player contracts should be expensed, it also held that
this rule was inapplicable to the acquisition of an entire roster of player contracts. Rosters
had to be capitalized, and, when any individual contract was disposed of, the taxpayer
reduced his basis. When the basis was reduced to zero, proceeds from the sale or exchange of
subsequent contracts were ordinary gains. Rev. Rul. 441, 1954-2 C.B. 101, 102. See Klinger,
supra note 35, at 277.
38. As one court noted: "Such an option might readily enhance the value of the . . .
[contract] but it could hardly be supposed to change the period during which the . . .
[contract] would become exhausted." Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 27 B.T.A. 1073, 1078 (1933).
39. Rev. Rul. 379, 1967-2 C.B. 127.
40. Rev. Rul. 137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
41. Rev. Rul. 379, 1967-2 C.B. 127, 128; Rev. Rul. 137, 1971-1 C.B. 104. Bonuses are not
paid to a large percentage of athletes but indemnity payments frequently may be assessed.
A 1971 study showed that only 10 of the top 14 rookies drafted and signed by the American
Basketball Association received bonuses and these averaged only $31,000 each. Okner, supra
note 9, at 170. The league rules in hockey and basketball, as well as football's "Rozelle Rule",
permit some form of indemnity to be paid by a team signing an athlete who had formerly
been under contract to another team.
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as a non-qualified deferred compensation agreement. This treat-
ment results in disallowance of the deduction until actual payment
of the bonus and precludes capitalization of the bonus amount.42
Gain on the sale or exchange of a contract is treated as capital gain;
loss is treated as ordinary loss under the normal rules applicable to
section 1231 assets. 43
Because the franchise right and player contracts have such differ-
ent characteristics for tax purposes, the entire tax future of a team
can depend upon the portion of its capital that is invested in each
of the two assets. Because the franchise right and a large number
of the team's player contracts are acquired with the initial transfer
of the team, this transfer becomes critical to tax planning for the
professional sports franchise. When a franchise is acquired, both the
purchaser and the seller must allocate the consideration paid or
received among the various assets transferred.44 The competing tax
interests of the parties tend to compel different allocations. The
buyer normally allocates as much of the consideration as possible
to those assets that can be amortized or depreciated in future years,
including player contracts and office and sports equipment.45 The
seller, on the other hand, will allocate as much of the acquisition
consideration as possible to those assets, such as the franchise right,
that will give him long term capital gains without depreciation re-
capture.46
42. See JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 3; Klinger, supra note 35, at 277 n.6. Even
the rulings on capitalization of signing bonuses paid athletes refer to the requirement that a
franchisee capitalize bonuses "paid" to the signing athlete. Bonuses deferred would not fall
within the ambit of these rulings. See Rev. Rul. 379, 1967-2 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 137, 1971-1
C.B. 104. See also Rev. Rul. 31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 181. Even if a deferred bonus is not added
to the basis of the contract, it does permit financing team improvement with deferred pay-
ments.
43. I.R.C. § 1231(a).
44. See Williams v. McGowar, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. Okner, supra note 9, at 165-66; Horvitz & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 177; Klinger, supra
note 35, at 278; Note, Professional Sports Franchising and the IRS, supra note 9, at 323. For
example, the buyer of one basketball franchise allocated 94% of the acquisition cost to player
contracts and nothing to the franchise right. Utah Stars, supra note 2, at 561-62. The IRS
has noted that most franchise owners allocate only a "nominal sum", usually $50,000, to the
franchise right itself; most of the remainder of the acquisition cost is allocated to player
contracts. IRS Manual, supra note 17.
46. Okner, supra note 9, at 175; Horvitz & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 177-78; Klinger, supra
note 35, at 279. See Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 75-2113 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 1975), cross appeal docketed, (5th Cir. May 28,
1975) (84% allocation); Kaufman v. United States, No. 289-76 (Ct. Cl., filed July 16, 1976);
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., No. 7486-74 (T.C., filed Sept. 9, 1974) (97% allocation).
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Prior to 1977, the buyer and seller were permitted to make in-
dependent allocations subject only to a requirement of "reason-
ableness."47 The ability of the buyer and seller to make different
allocations often resulted in a much criticized "whipsaw" of the
government.4 8 The IRS first attempted to restrain the clubs from
allocating most of the consideration to player contracts by contend-
ing that the substantial economic value of the franchise right
made such an allocation unreasonable.49 Recently, the IRS has de-
47. I.R.C. § 167(a). The deduction for depreciation or amortization of an asset permits a
"reasonable" allowance for wear and tear. The likelihood of change on audit has been thought
by some to be relatively low. Okner, supra note 9, at 166; Klinger, supra note 35, at 278.
Nevertheless, the IRS has 130 pending audit cases, so this assessment appears to be slightly
erroneous. Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 282.
When the franchise is exchanged directly for another franchise, no allocation is required
because the taxpayer has engaged in a like-exchange in which no gain or loss is recognized.
I.R.C. § 1031.
48. Different allocations can work to benefit either the government or the taxpayers. One
recent study noted:
The potential for "whipsaw" exists whenever two (or more) taxpayers have
adverse interests in the manner in which a specific item or transaction is taxed.
"Whipsaw" becomes a problem:
(1) for the Government, when the tax liabilities of the taxpayers are deter-
mined on the basis of inconsistent treatment of the item or transaction, enabling
each to receive a tax benefit to the detriment of the Government; and
(2) for the taxpayers, when their liabilities are determined on the basis of
such inconsistent treatment to their mutual disadvantage to the benefit of the
Government.
In the former case consistent treatment would indicate a tax deficiency to at
least one of the taxpayers, while in the latter case consistent treatment would
indicate that at least one of the taxpayers is entitled to a refund of tax.
Final Report of the Special Committee on Whipsaw, Section of Taxation, American Bar
Association, 30 TAx LAW. 127 (1976).
49. The IRS has notified its auditors to use a higher valuation for the franchise right and
a lower one for the player contracts than most franchisees use. It rationalizes its determina-
tion on the basis of the economic value of the franchise. First, the franchise right is asserted
to be the vehicle for obtaining rights to:
Territorial rights
Specified location
Share of TV income
Radio income
Gate receipts
Concessions
Advertising
Parking fees
Pay TV
Films
Player slots to be continuously filled
League membership
(a) Participation in Draft
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emphasized this argument, contending instead that the transferee
of a franchise acquires a roster of players rather than individual
contracts. The roster is treated as a "mass asset" which has no
reasonably ascertainable useful life because it is continually re-
newed. Moreover, the Government contends that the roster is nona-
mortizable because it has neither independent valuation nor useful
life separate from the franchise right itself, which provides the
means for marketing and replenishing the roster of players 0
This argument was rejected in the only case in which valuation
of player contracts was in issue. The court stated that it did not
"accept the Government's contention that it is impossible to estab-
lish, except in an arbitrary manner, a reasonably accurate basis for
depreciation of the player contracts acquired."'" Furthermore, the
majority of courts that have considered the "mass asset" argument
in non-sports cases have rejected it. 2
(b) Future Expansion
(c) Personnel to Officiate
Going concern [value]
(a) Scouting system
(b) Operating business management structure
(c) Affiliation agreement
(d) Lease arrangements.
Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 306. These rights are supposed to make
the franchise right the most valuable asset held by the team.
Second, if the underlying assumptions about the relative value of assets are correct, the
auditors are to use the Service's "prudent investor approach" to value the player contracts.
Under this approach, the value of the total player contracts is equal to the present value of a
$1.00 annuity for the average useful life of the contracts multiplied by the anticipated annual
predepreciation cash flow of the franchise. For example, a $16 million purchase of a football
team is expected to generate a cash flow of $1.2 million, and the player contracts have a five
year useful life. Under the Service's formula, the total value of the player contracts would be
only $5,000,000 ($1.2 million multiplied by 4.21236, the present value of a $1 annuity for five
years). IRS Manual, supra note 17, at __ . This approach has been suspended pending the
appeal in Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1975), appeal docketed, No.
75-2113 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 1975), cross appeal docketed, (5th Cir. May 28, 1975).
50. Jones, supra note 13, at 779.
51. Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1975), appeal docketed, No.
75-2113 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 1975), cross appeal docketed, (5th Cir. May 28, 1975). Thereafter,
the court allocated 35% of the total consideration to the player contracts. Id. at 671.
52. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1973); Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. United States, 460 F.2d 261,
262-63 (9th Cir. 1972); Super Food Services, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236, 1240 (7th
Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 367 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1966); KFOX, Inc.
v. United States, 510 F.2d 1365, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 9874 (Ct. Cl. 1975). A few courts, however, have accepted
the theory. See Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962); Golden State Towel &
Linen Serv., Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Westinghouse Broadcasting
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Courts generally have upheld the taxpayer's ability to amortize
an intangible asset acquired as part of a going business as long as
the asset has an independent value and ascertainable useful life.53
Although the IRS has conceded this point,54 it continues to contest
the principle's applicability to player contracts. 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A series of judicial decisions and labor agreements has caused
dramatic changes in the nature of player contracts. Because of these
changes and the new treatment of professional sports in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, the entire framework of professional sports team
taxation must be re-evaluated.
Impact of Labor and Antitrust Changes in Player Contracts
The terms of the player contracts in the four major sports (base-
ball, hockey, basketball, and football) have been changed recently
by judicial decisions and collective bargaining agreements. Baseball
and hockey clubs previously kept their players perpetually tied to
one team through indefinitely renewable option clauses and through
league reserve clauses forbidding other teams to "tamper" or negoti-
ate with players under contract to another team." Football and
Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961), aff'd on other grounds, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
935 (1962).
53. Jones, supra note 13, at 780; Klinger, supra note 35, at 277; Note, Amortization of
Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 81 HARV. L. REV.
859 (1968).
54. Rev. Rul. 456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
55. Fifteen cases in which the allocation of acquisition cost is at issue are pending cur-
rently. Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-
2113 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 1975), cross appeal docketed, (5th Cir. May 28, 1975) (Atlanta Fal-
cons); Kaufman v. United States, No. 289-76 (Ct. Cl., filed July 16, 1976) (Kansas City
Royals); Robert L. & Rose Marie Floyd, No. 2439-76 (T.C., filed Mar. 22, 1976) (Miami
Dolphins); id., No. 2534-76 (T.C., filed Mar. 24, 1976) (Miami Dolphins); id., No. 3357-76
(T.C., filed Apr. 20, 1976) (Miami Dolphins); Ray H. & Georgia S. Pearson, No. 2356-76
(T.C., filed Mar. 18, 1976) (Miami Dolphins); id., No. 2535-76 (T.C., filed Mar. 24, 1976)
(Miami Dolphins); William S. & Sarah Frates, No. 2541-76 (T.C., filed Mar. 24, 1976) (Miami
Dolphins); H. Earl Smalley, Jr., No. 8071-75 (T.C., filed Sept. 2, 1975) (Miami Dolphins);
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., No. 7486-74 (T.C., filed Sept. 9, 1974) (Philadelphia Flyers);
First North-West Industries of America, Inc., No. 8899-73 (T.C., filed Dec. 19, 1973) (Seattle
Supersonics); Charles 0. Finley & Co., No. 8342-71 (T.C., filed Dec. 16, 1971) (Oakland
Athletics); id., Nos. 7219-73, 7220-73 (T.C., filed Sept. 27, 1973) (Oakland Athletics); Charles
0. & Shirley Finley, No. 8343-71 (T.C., filed Dec. 16, 1971) (Oakland Athletics).
56. See Rev. Rul. 379, 1967-2 C.B. 127, 128; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 n.1
(1976).
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basketball teams kept their players tied to one team indefinitely by
nonrenewable option clauses and league rules requiring indemnifi-
cation by a team acquiring a player formerly under contract with
another team. If a player played out his option year, became a free
agent, and signed with another team, the acquiring team had to
make a mutually agreeable payment to the player's former team. If
no agreement were reached, the commissioner of the league could
mandate any indemnification in cash, draft choices, or other play-
ers.57 This practice so restrained other teams from signing free
agents in the absence of satisfactory interteam negotiations that
player mobility was substantially eliminated.
In professional baseball, the reserve system59 was altered signifi-
cantly by judicial affirmation of the Messersmith-McNally arbitra-
tion." The arbitrator held that the renewal clause in the standard
baseball contract was not perpetually renewable but that it pro-
vided only an option of renewal for one additional year after the
initial contract term. After that year, the player became a free agent
and could negotiate a new contract with another team. Further-
more, the arbitrator held that the baseball league's rule precluding
"tampering" with players under contract to other teams applied
only to the contract term and single option year.' Faced with the
prospect of other players becoming free agents, the league undertook
negotiations with the players' union and, on July 12, 1976, entered
into a tentative collective bargaining agreement."2
57. See Rev. Rul. 137, 1971-1 C.B. 104. JoINT COMMrTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 2 n.3; S.
REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 n.1 (1976).
58. A player who refused to renegotiate his contract and played out the option period
undertook a number of risks, including the risk of injury during the option year, a decline in
performance, and the risk that another team would not hire him because the potential
indemnity payment to the former contract owner would be too great. Noll, supra note 16, at
14.
59. The reserve system, which began by a secret agreement among club owners in 1879,
first was upheld in 1922 when the Supreme Court held baseball exempt from the federal
antitrust laws. Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922). In 1972 the Court reaffirmed the exemption, relying on stare decisis. Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). For an exhaustive history of the reserve system through
1952 see H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952) (Celler Committee report on organ-
ized baseball).
60. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409 F.
Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 53-54.
62. The failure of the leagues to finalize the tentative agreement led the Major League
Baseball Players Association to file an unfair labor practice grievance under section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1973).
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Under the tentative agreement, contracts not governed by the
Messersmith-McNally arbitration will contain a renewable option
clause, but league rules will not permit the clause to become perpet-
ual. After five years of major league service, a player may demand
to be traded or, after six years of service, he may become a free agent
and enter the player draft. 3 If a player demands to be traded, he
has a veto over six clubs; if no trade is consummated, he then
becomes a free agent."'
Hockey, unlike baseball, had a relatively quiet 1976 but saw hec-
tic years earlier in the decade. In 1973, after a series of inconsistent
decisions as to the validity of hockey contracts and rules under
federal antitrust laws," the reserve system was replaced by a combi-
nation of an option clause contract and an indemnity provision."
These changes permit a player to sign a contract for one year or for
a term of years with a single option year." If the player signs with
63. Three rules govern players under contract when the agreement is reached. If the player
was under a 1975 contract renewed for 1976, he becomes an automatic free agent at the end
of the 1976 season. If the player was under a 1976 contract renewed for 1977, he automatically
becomes a free agent at the end of the 1977 season unless a new contract is signed. If the player
was under a multiyear contract signed prior to ratification of the new collective bargaining
agreement, he automatically becomes a free agent at the end of the season following a one
year renewal of the contract unless a new contract is signed. Select Committee Hearings,
supra note 1, pt. 1, at 417 (copy of the tentative agreement). The first free agent draft under
the tentative agreement was held November 4, 1976. Each free agent could negotiate with a
maximum of 12 teams, but each club was restricted to signing the greater of one player for
each 14 in the draft or the number of free agents the team lost. Id. at 421-22.
64. Although a player may demand to become a free agent after serving in the league for
six years, he may not repeat this demand before another five years of service. Similarly, a
player who demands to be traded after five years may neither become a free agent for an
additional five years nor demand to be traded again for another three years. A player who
elects to become a free agent may elect to demand a trade after another three years. Id. at
418.
65. When the World Hockey Association (WHA) was formed in 1971, it sought to hire
players who were under option contracts with the National Hockey League (NHL). To pre-
vent the WHA from hiring these players, the NHL instituted four injunctive actions against
the Association. Two courts refused to grant the injunction. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n
v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded for factual determination, 472 F.2d 127
(1st Cir. 1972); Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972). One court
granted an injunction against enforcement of the NHL reserve clause. Philadelphia World
Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The fourth court
permitted the NHL a one year renewed option. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
66. National Hockey League By-Law Section 9A (adopted Nov. 27, 1973).
67. Paragraph 9A.2 of the NHL by-laws provides that the standard form player contract
shall contain the new section 17. This clause states:
(a) The Club may no later than August 10th of the final year of this contract,
tender the Player a Player's Termination Contract and notify him that he has
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another team after playing out his option and becoming a free agent,
an indemnity payment is required. This payment, if not reached by
agreement of the teams, is to be settled by arbitration rather than
by commissioner fiat."
Basketball contracts have been changed dramatically by the set-
tlement in Robertson v. National Basketball Association." Pur-
suant to this settlement, the standard form basketball contract,
with a few exceptions, need not contain an option clause of any
type.70 Veterans whose contract terms lapse may become free agents
and negotiate with another club, while rookies enter the player
draft. If a player becomes a free agent by playing out his contract
and signs with another team, indemnification is required. This may
be set by agreement or, if not agreed to, will be ordered by the league
commissioner for any transaction before the end of the 1980-81 sea-
son.7 After that season, but before the end of the 1986-87 season,
the choice of executing said Player's Termination Contract and delivering it to
the Club on or before September 10th of that year or automatically being uncon-
ditionally released from any further obligation to provide services under this
contract as of midnight, September 10th of that year. The Player's Termination
Contract shall be on the same terms and conditions as this contract except that
it shall be for only one additional season at the Player's previous year's salary
and shall provide for the Player's unconditional release from any further obliga-
tion to provide services under said Player's Termination Contract effective the
following June 1st.
National Hockey League Standard Player's Contract 17(a) (1974 Form).
68. The indemnity provision, referred to as an "equalization" clause, states:
Each time that a player becomes a free agent and the right to his services is
subsequently acquired by any Member Club other than the club with which he
was last under contract or by any club owned or controlled by any such Member
Club, the Member Club first acquiring the right to his services, or owning or
controlling the club first acquiring that right, shall make an equalization pay-
ment to the Member Club with which such player was previously under con-
tract, as prescribed by section 8 of this By-Law. Each Member Club may ac-
quire the right to the services of as many free agents as it wishes, subject to the
provisions of subsection 9 of this By-Law.
National Hockey League By-Law Section 9A, 9A.6 (adopted Nov. 27, 1973).
69. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, No. 70-1526, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1976),
reprinted in Select Committee Report, supra note 13, at 296.
70. The option clauses in contracts in force as of April 29, 1976, the date of the Robertson
settlement, were declared invalid except for those clauses that were to be exercised on or
before August 1, 1976 for the 1976-77 option year and clauses that were the subject of specific
negotiation on substantive matters such as economic terms. Id. at 302-03. Option clauses were
also permitted for one year options in either veteran or rookie contracts as long as the option
is exercisable only once for not more than one year and for not less than 100% of the player's
previous salary. Id. The Robertson settlement was incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement subsequently accepted by the players' association and the NBA.
71. Id. at 304-05.
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no indemnification is required, but the player's old team is given a
right of first refusal if it can substantially match the offer of the
competing team.7" Rookies who enter the player draft also are given
new rights. If a team drafts a rookie and cannot negotiate a contract
within one year during which the rookie is not playing for any other
team, the rookie enters the player draft again the following year.
The team drafting that rookie the second time also will have only
one year to sign him. After two years, the rookie becomes a free
agent and may negotiate with any team. 3
In football, amidst the onslaught of two major federal court deci-
sions74 that held the "Rozelle Rule" of compelled indemnification
unenforceable under federal antitrust law, a new collective bargain-
ing agreement was signed by the National Football League Manage-
ment Council and the Players' Association on March 1, 1977. Under
this new agreement, the option clause is eliminated from all football
contracts except for rookie one-year contracts and contracts of other
players when the clause is specifically negotiated between the team
and player. When the option clause is contained in the contract, it
must provide that the player will receive 110% of present compensa-
tion in the option year.75 If a player completes his option year he
may sign a contract with another team, but the team for which he
presently plays has a right of first refusal if it desires to match the
major terms of the new team's offer. If, on the other hand, the team
on which the athlete plays does not desire to match the new team's
offer, it has a right to compensation in the form of draft choices,
computed on a special scale based on the salary paid by the new
team. The compensation may range from a third round draft choice
to two consecutive first round choices. 76
These new contracts and league rules must be considered in eval-
uating proper treatment of player contracts for federal income tax
purposes. In baseball, for example, the IRS no longer can argue that
the contract terms and league rules result in a contract in which the
72. Id. at 305-11. Because the offer need be only substantially the same rather than identi-
cal, problems will likely arise as to the equality of offers. These disputes will be settled by
arbitration, Id. at 308.
73. Id. at 299-302.
74. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd, 543 F.2d
606 (8th Cir. 1976); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
75. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NFLPA & NFL Management Council Art.
XIV (1977).
76. Id. Art. XV, § 12.
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player "expressly bind[s] himself to play only for the club which
owns his contract for the entire period of his useful life as a player
in organized baseball."" Nevertheless, the contracts still should re-
tain a useful life "extending substantially beyond the taxable year
in which the contract is acquired,"78 requiring capitalization and
amortization, rather than expensing of the cost of the contract. It
should be readily apparent that if players are now assured of sub-
stantial transfer rights after five years in major league service, the
useful life of a contract to the team acquiring it must be shortened
significantly. Consequently, amortization deductions in a given year
should be increased.
A similar analysis should prevail for hockey, football, and basket-
ball, in which limited indemnification rules currently prevail. Al-
though the IRS has not issued a ruling on the capitalization of either
basketball or hockey contracts, a 1971 ruling that a football contract
extends over one year79 should apply to hockey and basketball as
well. This ruling demonstrates, however, that the IRS did not real-
ize precisely why players remained with one team throughout their
careers."0 Clearly the lack of player mobility was caused by the
Rozelle rule: the rule made most teams reluctant to hire players who
had played out their options and had become free agents, for fear
of extraordinary indemnification requirements."' Because profes-
sional basketball will use a commissioner-ordered indemnity
through the end of the 1980-81 season, it too should be governed
by the IRS's 1971 declaration. The first refusal requirement for
basketball after 1981, the arbitrated indemnification for hockey,
and the permanent first refusal for football, though compensated
with draft choices only, take them out of the ambit of the IRS's
published position and raise new questions about the treatment of
these contracts.
The effect of these rule changes generally will be a significant
reduction in the playing time an athlete spends with each team,
though probably not below one year. As a result, the useful life will
be shortened and the amortization will be made more rapid. If, on
77. Rev. Rul. 379, 1967-2 C.B. 127, 128.
78. Id. at 129.
79. See Rev. Rul. 137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
80. The IRS merely asserted that in many cases "the player remains with the team with
which he originally contracted for the duration of his playing career." Id.
81. See generally JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 6, at 2 n.3; Noll, supra note 16, at 4.
But see text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
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the other hand, these new rules have no real effect on player mobil-
ity and leave players subject to their contract terms, the rules from
early sports cases should apply and the contracts would be subject
to current deduction rather than capitalization.2 The option for a
second year would increase only the value of the contract, not its
useful life. The more likely result of these new rules will be capitali-
zation and amortization of player contracts over a shorter useful life.
Yet, until accurate data concerning the effect of the rule changes are
compiled, the position the IRS will take is mere speculation.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 and Sports Team Taxation
In addition to changes in the terms of player contracts, the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 affects team sports taxation by attempting to
restrict substantially tax advantages that professional sports for-
merly enjoyed. The professional sports franchise is affected by nu-
merous parts of the new tax law,"3 especially by the sections restrict-
ing tax shelters. 4 These new rules address the problems of whip-
saw, 85 unreasonable allocations of acquisition consideration to
player contracts, and recapture of deductions taken with respect to
player contracts.
The new law first codifies the rule that the transferee of a profes-
sional sports franchise takes an adjusted carryover basis in player
82. See Commissioner v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, 74 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1935);
Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1935); Commissioner
v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934), aff'g 27 B.T.A. 1074 (1933), acq. in
XIV-2 C.B. 17 (1935). The court in Pittsburgh Athletic Co. reviewed the option clause in
professional baseball, a clause which was similar to the football option clause absent the
Rozelle Rule and other special rules on tampering. The court noted:
By a parity of reasoning, the option to renew the players' contracts in the instant
case might enhance the value of the contracts but would not change the period
during which the contracts would become exhausted. Since 1931 the Board [of
Tax Appeals] has applied the ruling in Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner
[53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932)] and has held that
the cost of a contract containing an option to renew is a business expense in the
year when paid, and that the sum derived from the sale of a contract is income
in the year in which received.
72 F.2d at 884.
83. For example, the holding period extension for long term capital gains treatment will
affect the taxation of franchise sales if the franchises were held less than nine months in 1977
or one year after 1977. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1402, 90 Stat. 1520
(1976) (amending I.R.C. § 1222). See note 34 supra & accompanying text. The restrictions
on consideration of nonrecourse financing in the basis of a partner in a limited partnership
also will affect any franchises organized in that form. Id. § 213(e).
84. Id. § 212.
85. See note 48 supra & accompanying text.
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contracts received as part of the franchise.86 This basis, which in
most cases should equal the sales price attributable to the contracts,
is the transferor's basis increased by any gain recognized by the
transferor on the sale or exchange. There is no downward adjust-
ment for the transferor's recognized losses."
There are three exceptions to this general carryover basis rule.
First, the transferee receives an unadjusted carryover basis if the
transfer takes the form of a like-kind exchange.88 Second, if the
transferor is a decedent dying after December 31, 1976, the trans-
feree takes a carryover basis modified by various provisions of the
Tax Reform Act, most notably by the section providing for a "fresh-
start" basis as of December 31, 1976.89 Furthermore, if the transferor
is a corporation that has adopted a plan of liquidation by which its
assets will be sold and the proceeds distributed to the shareholders
without recognition of gain at the corporate level, the basis adjust-
ment is for the gain recognized by the transferor's shareholders
rather than that recognized by the transferor."
In addition to the modified carryover basis rules, the Tax Reform
Act requires the transferor to file with both the Secretary of the
Treasury and the transferee a statement noting the basis he claims
in the player contracts transferred and any gain recognized on the
transfer.9" Subsequent modifications of either of these two factors
must be reported also.9" This statement is binding on both the trans-
feror and transferee, thereby preventing different allocations and
potential whipsaw of the government."
The provisions eliminating whipsaw are coupled with a limitation
on the transferee's allocation of consideration paid for player con-
tracts. No more than fifty percent of the consideration paid for a
86. Id. § 212(a)(1) (adding I.R.C. § 1056(a)).
87. Id. (adding I.R.C. § 1056(a)(2)).
88. Id. (adding I.R.C. §§ 1056(b)(1) & 1031(a)).
89. Id. (adding I.R.C. § 1056(b)(2)).
The new law provides that the former stepped-up basis for property received from a dece-
dent is eliminated for property received from a decedent who dies after December 31, 1976
and replaced with a modified carryover basis. The carryover basis is adjusted for the apprecia-
tion prior to January 1, 1977, for a minimum basis adjustment of $60,000, and for other
statutory adjustments. Id. § 2005(a) (adding I.R.C. § 1023).
90. Id. § 212(a) (adding I.R.C. § 1056(a)). This appears to be logical because the corpora-
tion recognizes no gain in a liquidation qualifying under section 337 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
91. Id. (adding I.R.C. § 1056(c)(1) & (2)).
92. Id. (adding I.R.C. § 1056(c)(3)).
93. Id.
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franchise is presumed properly allocable to player contracts unless
the transferor or transferee establishes to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that a larger allocation is proper. 4 An allocation of less
than fifty percent of the consideration paid will not necessarily be
permissible; the IRS can still apply its test of "reasonableness" to
such allocations."
The third major restriction in the new law removes the treatment
of a sale of an entire franchise or of a substantial portion of a fran-
chise's player contracts from the ordinary recapture rules. The new
act imposes a far stricter set of rules. Whereas former law required
treatment of gain on the sale or exchange of a player contract as
ordinary income to the extent of post-1972 depreciation or amortiza-
tion,99 the new law applicable to the sale of an entire franchise treats
as ordinary income the greater of the amortization and casualty
loss 7 deductions on those contracts transferred or the amortization
and casualty loss deductions on contracts initially acquired with the
franchise, although these contracts may no longer be held by the
,owner."
Perhaps the greatest burden imposed by these new rules is that
94. Id. (adding I.R.C. § 1056(d)).
95. Id. Because the new law does not clarify the question of how player contracts and
franchise rights are to be valued for income tax purposes, this is likely to remain a much
litigated area. There is no reason for the IRS to grant automatically the taxpayer an allowance
of 50% of the franchise value to player contracts when this is more than it has formerly been
willing to allow. In Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1975), appeal docketed,
No. 75-2113 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 1975), cross appeal docketed, (5th Cir. May 28, 1975), for
example, the Service's auditor allocated about 12% of the franchise cost to the player con-
tracts and the District Court settled on about 34%. Both figures are, of course, substantially
below the 50% figure given in the new law. Consequently, the IRS probably will continue to
contest franchise allocations even below the 50% level.
96. I.R.C. § 1245(a).
97. Casualty losses are taken when a player under contract with a franchise is injured and
becomes worthless for competitive purposes. The contract may then be considered a total loss
and any remaining basis may be written off as a casualty loss. I.R.C. § 123. Actually, this is
not technically a casualty loss because such losses are found only in nonbusiness situations;
it is an abandonment loss. Id. § 1231.
98. Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 212(b), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (amending
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(4)). A drafting error appears in new subsection 1245(a)(4)(C), which reads:
"(ii) the aggregate of the amounts treated as ordinary income by reason of this section with
respect to prior dispositions of such player contracts acquired upon acquisition of the fran-
chise." The reference to "prior dispositions" of the contracts on which recapture has occur-
red, taken literally, would mean that the section would apply to player contracts formerly
disposed of by the franchise and then reacquired. Because this is not a likely situation,
apparently some drafting error has occurred which probably will be cured by a technical
amendments bill in the Ninety-fifth Congress. A measure to this effect is awaiting action by
the House Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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they will require far more extensive recordkeeping for professional
sports teams than for most other industries. The new recapture rules
alone will require every franchisee to maintain records of the amorti-
zation and casualty loss deductions taken on every contract ever
held regardless of when the franchise was acquired. Because many
sports franchises are held in excess of twenty years, particularly
baseball franchises,99 this can amount to a significant accounting
and bookkeeping burden.
Another question that should be raised about the provisions of the
Tax Reform Act pertaining to taxation of sports franchises is why
professional sports were singled out for this special treatment. Ad-
mittedly, no extensive factual examination produced a reason for
treating sports differently and more strictly than other businesses,
and the Treasury Department itself did not seek these restrictions.'0
The only logical answer is that Congress was swayed by the preva-
lent opinion that professional sports teams were tax-sheltered in-
vestments. This opinion, however, can be disputed, and analysis of
the actual operations of many sports teams shows that they are not
primarily tax-oriented investments. 0'
,99. A memorandum submitted by the Commissioner of Baseball noted that the San Fran-
cisco Giants had been retained by the present owners for 57 years, the Chicago Cubs for 44
years, the Philadelphia Phillies for 33 years, the Los Angeles Dodgers for 26 years, the Pitts-
burgh Pirates for 26 years, the Minnesota Twins for 56 years, the Boston Red Sox for 42 years,
and many other clubs for 14 or more years. Only 10 clubs of the 24 in the major leagues had
been owned for less than 10 years. Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 136.
100. See Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 2, at 89. The Secretary of the Treas-
ury noted:
These proposals are arbitrary since they apply only to sports francises. Allocat-
ing the purchase price among the assets of a sport franchise is no different from
allocating the purchase price among the assets of any other business. Applying
special rules to sports franchises to deal with a problem that the Internal Reve-
nue Service can handle adequately is not warranted. Further, the unique depre-
ciation recapture rule goes far beyond the usual asset-by-asset recapture rules
in the Code. Here, too, there is no apparent reason to isolate sports franchises
for special treatment.
See also Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 257-84.
101. See Select Committee Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 264-65. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy, William M. Goldstein, stated:
I think it [sports teams] can be marketed as such [tax shelters], particularly
where a new franchise is being sold or where a new league is being started and
the investors are encouraged, that although it may not work out financially at
least they will get some tax benefits even if it doesn't work out. But as far as
the new sports are concerned, whether it is lacrosse or soccer or tennis, it is just
not a tax shelter to put up $100 and lose it all even if you are in the 70-percent
bracket.
Id. at 264.
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By viewing the new law's restrictions as an entirety, however, it
is possible to speculate that they may lead to a diminution of the
slight trend toward operating the franchise in a tax-advantageous
manner, even to the point that the caliber of the sports show pro-
duced would be diminished. A reduction in transfers of franchises
is likely because of the increase in amortization and casualty loss
recapture and the inability of a new owner to allocate most of the
consideration paid to player contracts. In turn, this should mean
that franchises will remain in one place longer, contributing to the
betterment of the sport and the enjoyment of the fans.
COPING WITH THE TAXATION OF SPORTS TEAMS AFTER 1976
The Tax Reform Act unquestionably has limited the tax advan-
tages open to the professional sports franchise. Many of the changes
in player contract provisions occurring after the drafting of the Tax
Reform Act, however, appear to have created some offsetting tax
benefits.
First, in the four major sports, the appropriate useful life for
amortization purposes should drop significantly because of the new
contract provisions and league rules. This should be offset some-
what by the continuing trend toward multi-year contracts. The
multi-year contract will still permit total write-off when the athlete
becomes injured but, if there is no injury, it may result in the ath-
lete's remaining with a team beyond the period he would have
stayed under the year-plus option contracts. Consequently, multi-
year contracts should take useful lives in excess of those on one-year
contracts. Because the basis for new contracts will be lower, the
shorter life may result in an unchanged amortization deduction rate
under the maximum allocation rule.
Second, some tax planning opportunities exist within the ambit
of the new mandatory allocation rules for player contracts even in
sports in which such contracts must be capitalized and amortized.
For example, owners could split the rights contained in a profes-
sional sports franchise into separate indentifiable assets, each with
an ascertainable useful life. Although the television pooling agree-
ment easily could be identified as such an asset, this would be of
little help because it is normally viewed as an asset with an indefi-
nite useful life and thus avoids amortization in much the same
fashion as the franchise right itself. Local broadcasting agreements
of a predecessor franchisee, however, easily could be subject to am-
ortization if they are not shown to be renewed repeatedly with the
1977]
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same party. Similarly, contracts for advertising or for concession
percentages could be itemized and identified; such a process could
give rise to a greater amortization deduction for franchise owners
than if these contracts were included merely as part of the franchise
right.
These techniques will require some experimentation, and the
owners will bear the burden of proving that their factual interpreta-
tions are correct. The techniques do show that the professional
sports team can retain some tax vitality in the future despite the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 and, at least in part, because of the recent
nontax changes in the world of professional sports.
